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Introduction 
UnmannedAerial Vehicles (UAVs) date from 
anti-Zeppelin weapon trials in the First World 
War. However, other than acting ·as target 
drones, until recently UAVs were largely con-
fined to surveillance duties. At the tactical level, 
they offered a casualty-free means of briefing 
commanders on what was happening on the 
battlefield. Strategically, longer-endurance and 
higber-flying UAVs promised an alternative to 
satellites at much lower cost. But in the light of 
operational experience over Kosovo, and the 
resulting political fallout, this is a good time to 
re-evaluate the potential ofUAVs. 
Operational Experience 
Half a dozen nations used UAVs to an unprec-
edented extent over Kosovo, with US Army 
Hunters, Navy Pioneers and Air Force Predators 
conducting important reconnaissance opera-
tions. German and French CL-289s made battle 
damage assessments and detected emerging 
targets in Kosovo, while British Phoenix com-
pleted most of the 250 missions flown by the 
type to date. On 12 June 1999, staff in the 
Combined Air Operations Centre in Italy could 
see Serb MiG-21 s, hitherto hidden under the 
runway, taking-off from Pristina airfield before 
the Russians arrived. The pictures came from a 
camera in a Predator: the images were sent via 
data link to Mildenhall in Suffolk, thence to the 
Pentagon, and back out to all-takers including 
the Air Operations Centre, all in the space of 90 
seconds. 
NATO lost 20+ UAVs during the 78-day air 
operation, of which the US lost 10 Predators, 
Hunters and Pioneers. These figures were 
interesting on two counts. First, they put 20+ 
fewer lives at risk. Second, losses from Serbian 
ground fire and technical failures had little or no 
political impact, which would not have been the 
case if 20 pilots had been paraded througb the 
streets of Belgrade. But it is salutatory to note 
that NATO faced a relatively weak air defence 
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environment. While UAV s can now show air and 
ground commanders the real-time intelligence 
picture, allowing targets (and thereby crucial 
related factors like fusing) to. be changed in mid-
air, the Kosovo experience underlined UAVs' 
inherent vulnerability. 
Future Requirements 
The US Senate Armed Services Committee said 
in its report on Fiscal Year 200 I that, 'The 
American people are coming to expect that 
military operations are casualty-free.' The 
Committee chairman, John Warner, has thrown 
down the gauntlet by pronouncing that he would 
like to see one third of all operational US deep 
strike aircraft unmanned within a decade. This 
goal reinforces modern political pressure for a 
precise, all-weather strike capability to minimise 
civilian casualties, and a high war fighters' 
survival rate. 
On the face of it, UAVs have much to offer 
on both counts. In 1995, the US flew 500 
missions over 5 days to bring out Captain Scott 
O'Grady after his F-16 was brought down over 
Bosnia. UAVs should fly many of such combat 
search and rescue missions in future to avoid 
putting other aircrew at risk. UAVs can now 
loiter over a combat area for very long periods. 
Global Hawk, which is built to climb to 
65,000ft and fly for 40 continuous hours to 
conduct reconnaissance for up to 24 hours at a 
radius of 3,000 miles, made the first round-trip, 
non-stop, unescorted, unrefuelled flight by an 
UAV from the US to Europe on 10 May 2000. 
Global Hawk is flown via computer from 
'ground control' and its on-board sensors are 
designed 'to provide continuous day/night, high 
altitude, all-weather surveillance in direct sup-
port of Allied ground and air forces across the 
spectrum of conflict.' On paper, Global Hawk 
will make an ideal replacement for the U-2 
reconnaissance aircraft which, forty years after 
Gary Powers was shot down, is still flying 
operational missions every day from bases in 
South Korea, Europe, Saudi Arabia and the US. 
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Less ambitiously, the Australians are looking at 
Global Hawk for coastal and maritime patrol, 
and they will conduct a month-long in-country 
evaluation of the UAV next April to see ifil 
could at least compliment its P-3C force. 
There is a downside. Although the Pentagon" 
set a price goal of $10 million for each Global 
Hawk, the most recent contractor's projection 
is an average flyaway price of$15.3 million. As 
Global Hawk is a large 44-ft long aircraft with a 
wingspan of 116ft, it cannot just stumble around 
the busy skies. To comply with civil aviation 
regulations incurs added costs, both in payload 
that has to be devoted to safe operation rather 
than operational kit, and support teams on the 
ground. Global Hawk may be 'uninhabited' 
aloft, but as long as it needs a ground control 
organisation of Houston Mission Control propor-
tions, manned U-2 or P-3 aircraft will have the 
edge in support costs, payload and mission 
flexibility. 
Coming Soon - The Killer UAVs 
Over Kosovo, a Predator became the first US 
UAV to designate a target for an A-IO- launched 
laser-guided bomb. Pioneers also helped find 
targets for Boeing AGM-84 Stand-off Land 
Attack Missiles (SLAM) fired from US Navy P-
3C Orions. It now seems perverse to use 
expensive strike aircraft (each costing around 
$50million) to deliver precision munitions when 
UAVs could do the whole job: i.e. real-time 
command and control, target verification and 
designation, and low-weight bomb delivery. 
Boeing is designing an Uninhabited Combat 
Air Vehicle (UCAV) around a high subsonic 
speed, 500-1,000 mile mission radius and 1,000-
3,000lb payload capability. It is being developed 
to be airlifted into theatre - 6 per C-17, or 12 
per C-5 - and thereafter to suppress enemy air 
defences and 10 perform lethal strike missions. 
Next year, Boeing and the US Air Force plan to 
launch the first X-45 small-scale version of 
UCAV on its maiden test flight. The development 
programme will culminate in a mission during 
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which two UCAV s autonomously will detect, 
identify and strike a surface-to-air missile site 
while simultaneously evading enemy air de-
fences. All being well, the US UCAV should 
come on stream sometime after 20 I O. 
However, although the technology now exists 
for UAVs to deliver weapons as well as identify 
targets, it will take much time and mental 
readjustment before robots are allowed to kill. 
Although there is little difference between a UAV 
and a cruise missile - the former tends to come 
back - autonomous UCAV operations, with 
robot machines entrusted with making life and 
"death decisions, may be a 'Brave New World' 
step too far. Moreover, a willingness to put lives 
on the line is the highest measure of national 
resolve; the threatened use of robots alone might 
be perceived as a sign of the most tentative 
commitment. 
This is an age when evolving international 
law and targeting rules impose ever-stricter 
constraints. Last year, a Global Hawk crashed 
because its flight termination system was 
accidentally triggered by an abort signal from 
another UAV being tested more than 250km 
away. Over Kosovo, one French source has 
attributed the loss of two NATO UAVs to elec-
tromagnetic emissions from a jamming US Navy 
EA-6B Prowler. UCAV designers and engineers 
will have to meet very robust performance and 
reliability targets before politicians will give their 
creations wide freedom to operate. Until that 
time, while we can expect to see UCAVs in-
creasingly flying at the outskirts of an aerial 
strike package undertaking the dangerous tasks 
of destroying enemy SAM sites and target 
designation, inhabited 'mother ships' will con-
tinue to control proceedings. 
The Challenges 
Just as a professional golf player needs a variety 
of clubs, an air commander intending to take on 
a host of targets in all weathers will do best if 
he can call on a mix of manned aircraft, UAV/ 
UCAVs and cruise missiles. 
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Saab Technologies Netdefence concept is a 
good example of the way forward. Netdefence 
envisages a smorgasbord of UAYs designed to 
operate alongside the Swedish Air Force's main 
manned aircraft - the airborne early warning 
SIOO Argus and JAS39 Gripen multirole fighter. 
Above all would be the high altitude, long 
endurance (HALE) Gladen carrying Ericsson's 
Erieye AEW radar, Carabas foliage penetration 
radar, synthetic-aperture imaging radar or other 
surveillance payload. At medium level there 
would be the Skuadern strike reconnaissance 
UAY. Skuadern would be expected to go where 
it was no longer safe for man to go, reconnoi-
tring targets for attack by the manned Gripen, 
which would leave behind a Getoga UAY to 
undertake a damage assessment, monitor recov-
ery efforts, and summon a second strike if 
needed. Saab has a design for an UCAY to take 
on those missions too dangerous for Gripen. 
UAYs will prosper by playing to their 
strengths. Over Kosovo, UAYs were found to be 
well suited to land mine detection and watching 
over returning refugees. As machines are best at 
remote sensing and communications, UAYs 
offer much when it comes to chemical and 
radiological sampling in the event of another 
Chernobyl, or providing a surrogate reconnais-
sance or communication satellite service. 
We can expect to see new families of UAY s 
filling the gap between slow and long-ranging 
Global Hawk, and the low, fast-flying and lethal 
UCAY. The future lies in miniaturisation, with 
individual troop companies having their own 
dedicated UAY in their rucksack. Northrop 
Grumman is working on a Miniature Air-
Launched Interceptor technology demonstrator, 
designed to prove that a swarm of inexpensive, 
self-organising, lethal UAYs can counter incom-
ing cruise missiles. But success in the UAY race 
will not just go to the most technologically 
adept, but rather to those positioned at the point 
where manned platforms and UAYs 'intersect'. 
At this stage, 'smart' UAYs and UCAYs will 
complement sophisticated inhabited aircraft as 
much as replace them. 
Technological developments and reduced 
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military manpower levels combine to give UAYs 
a variety of roles across the spectrum of opera-
tions. UAYs can provide disaster relief and 
environmental monitoring information. They are 
well suited to the tedious but vital confidence-
building Open Skies verification work. They can 
also do much to help counter-drug, sanctions 
enforcement, counter-insurgency and counter-
terrorism activities. But a UAY is not a vacuum 
cleaner. Development and production of high 
quality, lower cost sensors will have to parallel 
those in airframes. The aims must be to make 
the UAY both a discerning, real-time system and 
an almost disposable item. 
UAY vulnerability was clear over Kosovo. 
The Serbs knew what they were up against -
the remains of a shot-down Predator had been 
on display in the Yugoslav Air Force Museum in 
Belgrade since 1995. As the majority of NATO 
UAY units were based in Macedonia, geography 
played into the hands of Serb defenders because 
they had only to plan on UAY s approaching from 
a limited number of directions. It was therefore 
easy to position guns and hand-held heat-
seeking missiles under likely UAY flight paths. 
The most innovative Serb tactic was to fly a 
Hip helicopter alongside a UAY so that the door 
gunner could blast it out of the sky with a 
7.62mm machine gun. Had the conflict contin-
ued NATO might have had to restrict UAYs to 
almost wholly night operations to reduce attri-
tion rates on the small number of airframes 
available. 
Just as many nations are eyeing UAYs as the 
military acquisition ofthe moment, so anti-
aircraft defence teams are designing weapons to 
shoot down the highly intrusive UAYs that may 
soon be coming. In an age where winning the 
economic contest is as important as winning the 
military contest, the ideal aim must be "to pro-
cure a fleet ofUAYs that cost less than the 
missiles positioned to shoot them down . 
While UAYs are increasingly being seen as 
integral parts of an overarching intelligence or 
strike system rather than just platforms, there 
are other challenges still to be faced. First, 
much will have to be done to integrate UAYs 
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into a complex battle space full of manned 
aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. For a small 
nation, Sweden's UAV plans are ambitious but 
not unique. However, they will only work if 
Argus, Gripen, Gladen and Skuadern are nodes 
on the came C31 web, connected by a broad-
band network that is compatible with all other 
military formations with which the Swedes 
could be involved in coalition operations. Such 
seamless interoperability will become even more 
important once micro and palm-held UAV s arrive 
in service. 
Second, only 66% of Kosovo UAV missions 
were completely fault free. A reputation for 
unreliability will limit UAV use and put doubt 
into a commander's mind as to whether to use 
the system at all. UAV designers and users must 
strive for the same reliability levels, and associ-
ated strict inspection regimes, as for manned 
aircraft. Civil aviation authorities will certainly 
not allow free access to UAVs until the ma-
chines, systems therein and people who maintain 
and operate them are up to acceptable safety 
standards. 
Third, much effort will be required in the 
unsexy but crucial fields of digitisation and 
expanded bandwidths. The Kosovo experience 
showed that U AV s are opening the door to 
micro-management of operations by senior 
politicians and commanders far removed from 
the action. But UAVs should not be procured to 
enable the great and the good to watch an 
unfolding soap opera, but rather to enable them 
to make better, timely decisions. And the key to 
military and political success in future will rely 
on the successful passage of real-time informa-
tion. Commanders, and even prime ministers, 
may insist on seeing for themselves before they 
will authorise an engagement. Providing the 
necessary bandwidth for real-time targeting 
video will be expensive, but it may be essential 
in an age when the media is screaming for 'the 
truth' and evidence is needed that will stand up 
in an international court. 
Fourth, the Kosovo system, whereby Ger-
man, French and British UAV assets remained 
under the command of their respective brigades, 
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is inadequate. Co-ordination ofUAV activities 
was not of the best, and on occasions even US-
controlled Predators and H':'nters were sent to 
the same target and ended up filming each other. 
There can be no place in the modern battlefield 
for complex and convoluted chains of com-
mand. The answer lies in a culture change. 
British operational UAV expertise is largely 
confined to the Royal Artillery because Phoenix 
was originally procured to target long-range 
artillery. This grafting ofUAVs onto established 
military structures is both typical and under-
standable, but as UAVs become integrated into 
wider intelligence, target acquisition, and sur-
veillance systems, or become strike vehicles, the 
doctrine that underpins their employment and 
operation will need to grow beyond that of a 
gunnery culture. Across the Atlantic, UAVs are 
procured, financed and generally compart-
mentalised just like any other single-service 
weapons system. Neither the US nor the British 
approach is a good foundation for getting the 
best out of a revolutionary new way of doing 
security business. Sooner rather than later, 
smart defence ministries should invest a tri-
service 'UAV Supremo' with the wherewithal to 
forge a coherent intelligence, surveillance, target 
acquisition, strike support and reconnaissance 
U AV doctrine and capability. 
Conclusion 
It is a measure ofthe demonstrable usefulness and 
potential ofUAVs that ma.ny nations have added 
these systems to their military inventories over the 
past 5 years. This is because U AV s have come of 
age. Gone are the days when the nation that 
created the Spitfire and Concorde could not put 
together the Phoenix - not much more than a 
scaled-up model aircraft powered by a glorified 
lawnmower engine - in anything like the original 
timeframe or budget. After numerous false starts 
and flawed procurement programmes, the latest 
UAV/uCAV generation is serious aviation. UAVs 
have a bright futore, which is more than can be 
said for tanks or heavy artillery. 
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But while UAVs keep aircrew out of harm's 
way, they are not a panacea. Maximum cruise 
speed for tactical Hunter and Phoenix is no 
more than 85kts flat out, which can mean long 
transit times between targets during which time 
the bird could have flown. UAVs lack an all-
weather capability because their wings can ice 
up, which means that Phoenix and Hunter only 
work over the former Yugoslavia from spring to 
autumn. Moreover, they are not cheap. Pentagon 
staffs are finding that UAVs are costing more 
than they expected by a factor of four. 
Although UAV s are the military fashion of the 
moment, it should never be forgotten that they 
are not a capability in themselves - they are 
'enablers'to attain a capability. In other words, 
UAVs should only be procured if they are the 
most effective means of fulfilling a task. For the 
foreseeable future, manned aircraft and cruise 
missiles will continue to execute some tasks far 
better than UAVs, which means that the best 
military air option is a mix of all three. That 
said, as UAVs become technologically robust, 
and politicians learn to trust them and accept 
that some of these far-from-cheap systems will 
not come back, we can expect to see a quali-
fied, progressive expansion in UAV roles, capa-
bilities and numbers over the next 20 years. 
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Abbreviations: 
BombiDom - BombardieriDomier 
Int -International 
Recce - reconnaissance 
Surv - surveillance 
TA - target acquisition 
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